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The potential for collisions with natural particles (meteoroids) at relative 
velocities up to 72 km/sec (155,000 mph) has historically been a design consideration for 
spacecraft. The deposition of man-made particles, referred to as orbital debris, into orbit 
around the Earth presented an even more severe hypervelocity impact problem for 
spacecraft designers. This paper examines the threat to the International Space Station 
Alpha (JSSA) imposed by the meteoroid/orbital debris (M/OD) environment and the risk 
management approaches implemented to mitigate the threat. 
The ISSA program has established a balanced strategy for managing the risks 
associated with the M/OD threat based on the following three principles: I) maximize 
design protection by implementing state-of-the-art shielding, 2) track and avoid the larger 
objects, and 3) minimize residual risk by implementing risk control and abatement 
features and procedures. 
Even though NASA is using effective hardware and operational risk mitigation 
approaches, there remains a residual risk of a penetrating impact. Due to weight, volume, 
and funding constraints, a gap exists between the passive protection (shielding) capability 
and active protection (collision avoidance) lower particle size tracking limits. 
Fortunately, the estimated number of impacts per year decreases exponentially as the size 
of the particle increases. With the implemented design and planned operational measures, 
the resulting residual risk of an impact that could potentially cause severe damage to the 
station is extremely small. Options are continually being assessed and implemented to 
reduce the residual risk and increase reliability. Control of the debris threat is being 
pursued by NASA through international treaties and agreements among all space-faring 
nations. These agreements refer to guidelines for the design, development and operation 
of satellites with the intent to reduce the evolving orbital debris environment. 
I. INTRODUC"flON 
The potential for collisions with natural particles (meteoroids) at relative 
velocities up to 72 km/sec (155,000 mph) has historically been a design consideration for 
spacccrnfl. The deposition of man-made particles, referred to as orbital debris, into orbit 
around the Earth presented an even more severe hypervelocity impact problem for 
spacecraft designers. This paper examines the threat to the Jntcrnational Space Station 
Alpha (ISSA) imposed by the meteoroid/orbital debris (M/OD) environment and the risk 
management approaches implemented to mitigate the threat. 
2. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MIOD THREAT 
The Oux of M/OD particles that arc encountered by an object in low Earth orbit is 
essentially random but lends ilSclf well to statistical quantification of the number of 
particles of a given characteristic size that would be encountered by a rnndomly tumbling 
Oat plate per unit area and time. Flux is defined as number of intercepted objects per unit 
time and area, typically in terms of per square meter per year. The primary method of 
charncterizing the threat of significant damage to the ISSA operating within the M/OD 
environment is described in temis of a probability of no penetration (PNP). The PNP 
function is described as: 
PNPJd > IJ,·111 I = e fu1 
where 
I = 1~nctrating Oux, number of panid cs per s4uare meter per year of 
diameter d (Jf larger that defeat the shielding (0,.,i1 ) 
a = effective area ol spacecraft, s4. meters 
1 = time in space, years 
2.1 Meteoroids 
Meteoroids arc naturnl bodies remaining from the formation of the solar system or 
from col lisions of other natural bodies making up the solar system. Nearly all meteoroids 
originate from comets or asteroids. The meteoroid Oux represents al any time a total of 
aboul 200 kg or mass within 2000 km of the Earth's surface. Most of this mass is 
concentrated in 0.1 mm or smaller micrometeoroids. 
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The precession of the spacecraft's orbit and tilt of the Earth's equatorial plane relative to 
the ecliptic contribute to making the micromctcoroid environment relatively 
omnidirectional. The micrometcoroid threat becomes anisotropic relative to the 
spacecraft moving through the environment with most strikes coming from the direction 
of motion. Further, shadowing provided by the Earth tends to reduce strikes in the 
direction of the Earth (nadir). 
The meteoroid environment model remains relatively unchanged since its initial 
documentation in the l 960's. The implemented model is very similar to that used for the 
design and assessment of Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle. In discussions with Russian 
technical experts, the NASA meteoroid model was determined to be very similar to the 
model that was used for the design of their spacecraft including the currently orbiting 
MIR. This time proven model is being used for ISSA design. 
2.2 Orbital Debris 
Man-made orbital debris differs from natural meteoroids because it remains in 
Earth orbit during its lifetime instead of passing through the space around the Earth. 
Within 2000 km of the Earth's surface there is an estimated 1.5 to 3 mi llion kg of man-
made orbiting objects as ofmid 1988. Most of these arc in high inclination orbi ts where 
they sweep past each other at an average velocity of 10 km/s. About 1500 spent rocket 
stages, inactive payloads, and a few active payloads account for most of this mass. These 
objects along with 4500 others totaling about 20,000 kg, arc mostly fragments of satell ites 
or other orbiting hardware. Observations indicate a total mass of about I 000 kg for 
orbital debris with diameters of 1 cm or smaller and about 300 kg for orbital debris sizes 
smaller than 1 mm. This distribution of mass makes the orbital debris environment more 
hazardous than the meteoroid environment in most spacecraft applications below 2000 
km altitude as is certainly the case fo r ISSA. 
Figure 1 shows the comparison of meteoroid and orbital debris fluxes as a function 
of size from the environmental model currently bascl incd for ISSA design. As a result of 
measurements and analyses of the orbital debris environment conducted over the last 
three years, revisions to the orbital envi ronment model for the space station arc being 
formulated and arc now under review. The measurements and analyses indicate that the 
Oux for orbital debris larger than 0.5 cm at space station altitudes is as much as a fac tor of 
two lower than current model predictions. 
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3. M/OD PROTECTION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Strategic Plan 
The ISSA program has established a strategy for managing the risks associated 
with the M/OD threat based on the following three principles: I) maximize design 
protection by implementing state-of-the-art shielding, 2) track and avoid the larger 
objects, and 3) minimize residual risk by implementing risk control and abatement 
features and procedures. This three part approach to the strategic plan is related to the 
small, midrange, and large particle size regimes illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. M/OD Stncegic Plan 
Over 99% of the number of threatening particles arc small enough (microscopic to 
marble size) that the potentially damaging penetrations may be avoided by hardware 
protection systems (shielding). For this reason, primary emphasis is placed on design 
protection as the preferred method of risk mitigation. Operational mitigation approaches 
include scheduled maintenance and repair activities and collision avoidance maneuvers. 
Even though NASA is using effective hardware and operational risk mitigation 
approaches, there remains a residual risk of a penetrating impact. Due to weight, volume, 
and funding constraints, a gap exists between the passive protection (shielding) capability 
and active protection (collision avoidance) lower particle size tracking limits. 
Fortunately, the estimated number of impacts per year decreases exponentially as the size 
of the particle increases. With the implemented design and planned operational measures, 
the resulting residual risk of an impact that could potcmially cause severe damage to the 
station is e:ittremcly small. Penetration effects analyses examine the potential hazards 
associated with a penetration of a habitable module or other critical item. These analyses 
are used to assess the ability of the ISSA to safely pcrfonn its mission with a reliability 
gos! of great« than 99.7% per year. Options arc continually OCing assessed and 
implemented to reduce the residual risk and increase reliability. 
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3.2 Hardware Design Protection 
The hardware design protection strategy consists of dedicated shielding of M/OD 
critical items. An item is classified as M/OD critical when effects resulting from a 
penetration could immediately endanger the survivability of the space station or the crew 
(items primarily consist of the habitable modules). Although all exposed components are 
subject to M/OD impacts, those which do not impose immediate, time critical hazards to 
crew or station survival are evaluated and shown to meet against established equipment 
performance and maintainability criteria. 
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Figure 3. Typkal Whipple Shield 
The basic shielding techniques 
utilized on the U.S. habitable modules 
consists of a thin plate of aluminum 
with a stand off from the pressure wall 
(see Figure 3). Known as a "Whipple" 
shield, this simple but highly effective 
technique utilizes the outer bumper to 
break up the impacting particle into 
smaller pieces thus distributing the 
impact on the primary wall. Due to 
the tremendous level of energy 
dissipated during an impact, character-
ization of the event is complicated by 
the transphase/multiphase physical 
processes and thennodynamics of the events that follow. Hypervelocity impact testing 
at velocities up to 7 km/s and sophisticated hydrocode analytical simulations are used to 
characterize the penetration resistance of M/OD shielding. 
Recent NASA developments in shield technology have advanced the state-of-the-
art in hardware protection systems. Enhanced shielding incorporating intermediate non-
metallic layers of Nextel™ (3-M Corp.) and Kevlar™ (DuPont) will be used on the U.S. 
Hab and Lab modules. The penetration resistance of these shields result in PNP levels of 
greater than 99.8% per year. Figure 4 is a hydrocode simulation of a "stuffed" Whipple 
shield stopping a 0.849 cm diameter particle. 
Should the M/OD flux levels increase greater than anticipated environment growth 
during the operational life of the station, the capability to further mitigate the risk is 
designed into the station. Mounting locations are included in the hardware to allow for 
on-orbit addition ofM/OD shielding. 
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Figure 4. "Stuffed" Whipple Impact Simulation 
3.3 Debris Collision Avoidance 
Orbital debris is tracked and cataloged by the United States Space Command 
(USSPACECOM) Space Surveillance Network. Currently USSPACECOM assists 
NASA by providing information that is used to determine the need for performing debris 
avoidance maneuvers for the space shuttle orbiter. The ISSA program plans to continue 
this arrangement and is now developing procedures for executing debris collision 
avoidance maneuvers. 
Utilizing existing network capabilities to track particles down to approximately 
10 cm diameter, debris avoidance maneuvers will be executed as required to avoid 
collisions with the larger objects. Early estimates indicate from I to 10 maneuvers per 
year may be expected. The actual number of maneuvers anticipated in a year is a function 
of estimated debris flux, relative position uncertainties, and collision probability 
thresholds yet to be established. These thresholds will be carefully derived to minimize 
risk of collisions while still permitting the space station to carry out its scientific mission 
objectives. 
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3.4 Risk Abatement and Control 
Additional measures are being pursued to reduce potential M/OD hazards 
including: hatch closure protocols to isolate modules in the event of a depressurization, 
penetration repair procedures, internal spall blankets to minimize effects of debris 
fragments, advanced test and analysis techniques to reduce uncertainties in the 
penetration resistance equations, and refined penetration effects analysis. Further, 
operations procedures may be modified during periods of high flux (i.e., meteor storms). 
An integral part of risk management is a long term commitment by NASA to 
monitor the debris environment over the ISSA operational period accompanied by 
assessments of the updated environment. Control of the debris threat is being pursued 
through international treaties and agreements among all space-faring nations. These 
agreements refer to guidelines for the design, development and operation of s:ifollites with 
the intent to reduce the evolving orbital debris environment. 
4. SUMMARY 
Protecting the ISSA from meteoroids and orbital debris is particuliirly challenging 
due to its long mission duration and large surface area. A multifaceted strategy and long-
term risk management program to achieve safe and reliable operations has been 
implemented by the ISSA program. The NASA, prime contractor, and international 
partner team is committed to producing innovative and practical solutions to the M/OD 
challenge. 
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